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The goal of this thesis was to give information and raise up new ideas for the start of detailed 
design of integrated platform management system. What could be expected, what kind of features 
could be beneficial, what is the reason for such a system, and can it help with requirements like 
better survivability with leaner manning? This work is not concentrating on some specific feature, 
it is intended to offer a broader look on the topic. Broader view was seen as the best and most 
usable result for this kind of work. 
The aim was to form a good picture of what the limitations are on current ships and how the 
situation could be improved. The first step was to interview system experts who have deep 
knowledge about the systems and current issues. During the interviews these experts were asked 
questions like what the problems with current system automation are and are there any systems 
which are lacking information that is available in other systems but is not shared. From these 
interviews a few areas of interest where formed. Literature review was used to gather more 
information to each subtopic.  
The result of this thesis is that yes, integrated platform management system can be an asset to 
improve ship and its crew performance. It is also clear that the integrated platform management 
system must be designed for the ship, taking into account what it is used for and where. For 
smaller and simpler ships used against inferior enemy or in less hostile environments simpler 
integrated platform management system with features focusing to ease of use, maintenance costs 
and lean manning could be the best option. For larger and more complex ships used against 
advanced enemy, features could concentrate on better survivability by implementing features for 
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- Käyttökelpoisuuden arviointi 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tavoitteena oli antaa tietoa ja kehittää uusia ideoita integroidun 
alustanhallintajärjestelmän yksityiskohtaisen suunnittelun aloittamiseksi. Mitä järjestelmältä 
voidaan odottaa, millaisista ominaisuuksista voisi olla hyötyä ja voiko se auttaa sellaisissa 
vaatimuksissa kuten parempi taistelunkestävyys tai pienempi miehistön määrä? Tässä työssä ei 
keskitytä yhteen tiettyyn toiminnallisuuteen ja sen loppuun asti suunnitteluun. Nykyiseen 
tietotarpeeseen vastaa paremmin aihealueen laajempi tarkastelu. 
Ensimmäinen vaihe oli muodostaa ymmärrys nykyisten järjestelmien rajoituksista aluksilla, sekä 
siitä miten tilannetta voitaisiin parantaa. Tämä vaihe suoritettiin haastattelemalla 
järjestelmäasiantuntijoita, joilla on syvälliset tiedot järjestelmistä ja niihin liittyvistä haasteista. 
Haastattelujen aikana asiantuntijoilta kysyttiin mm. millaisia ongelmia nykyisissä 
järjestelmäautomaatioissa on ja puuttuuko yksittäisiltä järjestelmiltä tietoa jota olisi muiden 
järjestelmien tiedossa, mutta tietoa ei jaeta. Haastatteluiden pohjalta muodostettiin aihealueita, 
jotka otettiin paremman tarkastelun kohteeksi. Jokaiseen aihealueeseen kerättiin lisää tietoa 
kirjallisuuskatsauksen kautta. 
Opinnäytetyön lopputulemana on, että integroidusta alustanhallintajärjestelmästä voi olla hyötyä 
laivan ja sen miehistön suorituskyvyn parantamiseksi. On myös selvää, että integroitu 
alustanhallintajärjestelmä on suunniteltava alukselle ottaen huomioon, mihin alusta käytetään ja 
missä. Pienemmillä ja yksinkertaisemmilla aluksilla, joita käytetään heikompaa vihollisia vastaan 
tai aluksilla toimitaan vähemmän vihamielisissä ympäristöissä, yksinkertaisin integroitu 
alustanhallintajärjestelmä, jossa ominaisuudet keskittyvät helppokäyttöisyyteen, 
ylläpitokustannuksiin ja pienempään miehistön määrään voivat olla paras vaihtoehto. 
Suuremmille ja monimutkaisemmille aluksille joita käytetään edistynyttä vihollista vastaan, 
ominaisuuksissa tulee panostaa parempaan taistelunkestävyyteen keskittymällä ominaisuuksiin, 
jotka parantavat miehistön tilannetietoisuutta ja edistävät vaurioista palautumista. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Integrated platform management system (IPMS) is a system which can control and 
monitor all the needed ship subsystems from propulsion to hatch control. If IPMS is 
compared to a more traditional machinery control or integrated automation systems (IAS) 
found on commercial ships, the IPMS is more or only intended for Naval applications. 
There are lots of similarities and no clear line can be drawn between IPMS and IAS. Most 
clearly distinctive features are related to the battle damage control features of the IPMS. 
There is no shelf IPMS solution which would fit for everyone, each installation needs to 
be designed to meet the applicable requirements. On high level the need could be to 
decrease the size of crew, increase reliability or increase survivability. There is no 
limitation on vessel size, so very simple solution can be adequate for small vessels while 
more complex ship can utilize the whole benefit of full feature IPMS.   
1.1 Background 
New ship projects on Finnish Defense Forces Logistic Command (FDFLOGCOM) are 
starting in quite steady intervals. At the same time when these projects are starting or 
ongoing there is constant pressure from the Navy to have more performance with less 
crew. In addition, FDFLOGCOM is giving pressure to limit the maintenance and life-cycle 
costs of the ships. Could both requirements be fulfilled by increasing the level of 
automation? Because IPMS is a new topic for FDFLOGCOM and there is limited amount 
of experience or other information available from open sources, this thesis is intended to 
give more ideas for the start of the ship design phase. This is achieved by raising up 
issues with current systems and finding out features which could benefit the end user or 
maintainer. 
Finnish Navy ships have had modern automation systems for a long time. But currently 
most of the automation systems on board are standalone. Standalone in this case means 
that they are not interfaced to any other system and for all information needs they have 
provided their own sensors or other information input method. Some systems like the 
Integrated bridge system (IBS) have of course interface to other systems like the 
Integrated automation system (IAS) or propulsion and rudder control, but in many other 
systems the operator is the interface. The operator can see what a system is displaying 
7 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Waltteri Kaikkonen 
and with that information they can control another system. With highly trained and 
experienced crew which doesn’t make mistakes this is a good way of making things work. 
But using humans can be quite expensive. They must be trained for a long period, they 
can decide to change position or leave completely, and they need to get paid constantly. 
Accommodation, food, drink and entertainment must be arranged onboard the ship. 
During wartime they can be easily lost and are difficult to replicate.  
Of course, standalone systems have their benefits. Several independent standalone 
systems are easy from the procurement and installation standpoint. Testing can also be 
simple and done maybe even by a single system provider or Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM). No difficult tri-lateral contracts or interface specifications are 
needed. Just good old form fit function requirements which are usually quite straight 
forward, and no one needs a degree on business laws to understand them.  
1.2 Problems and targets 
Requirements like the lean manning or increased survivability may force designers to 
think beyond this standalone situation. Could integration of some systems into a single 
system help meeting these requirements? How to know which are the systems 
benefitting the most from integration to another system? How to know what to require 
and expect form IPMS? A good starting point would be an applicability study on what 
features should be studied more closely. 
Is IPMS a good and valuable asset for ships made for different applications or ships with 
different sizes? What is the main reason to even consider such a system? What features 
it should have to be an asset to the crew? How reliable it can be and when it malfunctions 
could it be a liability? Should some systems be controlled by IPMS or should it be more 
of an observer. This thesis tries to answer at least to some of these questions by 
including interviews of sub matter experts, by looking into accident reports and other 
literature work related to IPMS. 
On the early stages of this thesis it was discussed if it should concentrate on narrower 
area to be able to go into deeper details. However, it was decided that for Finnish 
Defence Forces (FDF) the most useful result is a broader view of the topic.   
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1.3 Limitations 
This work is not going to be market review or evaluation of existing systems. The style 
of this thesis is not going to be a scientific research, but more like a development work. 
The features listed in this thesis are not covering all the possibilities but are concentrating 
on a few which seemed most interesting during interviews. Combat system is limited to 
only provider or receiver of information and combat management system (CMS) features 
are mostly left out. The references for this thesis are based only on unclassified 
information and open sources, but the names of interviewees are not released. Many of 
the ideas for future systems which came from the interviews or from the author are not 
complete, e.g. the idea that something should be measured to benefit something. How 
the actual measurement is done or are there suitable sensors on the market or could 
they be developed is not part of this thesis. No simulations or modelling are made for 
this thesis.  
1.4 Text structure 
To give perspective what the state-of-the-art solution should be these days there is in 
chapter 2 a high-level brief on Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Queen Elizabeth and how the 
IPMS is implemented in it. Chapter 3 describes in more detail the topics to be researched. 
Chapter 4 will describe the results and in chapter 5 four accidents are reviewed with an 
estimation of if IPMS could help on those situations. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions 
of this thesis. 
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2 INTEGRATED PLATFORM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
NOW 
From magazine articles and system supplier brochures it could be felt that IPMS is a 
system which is appearing in many places but very little real information can be found. 
Naval ships and their detailed design are probably never going to be an openly discussed 
topic in public. From older ships like the HMS Sheffield some information could be found 
but its availability is limited and acquiring such information is not in the budget of this 
thesis. If this thesis work is trying to look into the future, probably not much useful 
information could be found on ships which are commissioned earlier than 90’s and are 
not upgraded with IPMS. 
From these public sources it can be seen that at least some Navies have seen the 
benefits of IPMS. The Spanish Armada has developed its own system and mandated 
that all current and future ships shall use it. (Defence SA Advisory Board, 2009). 
According to Naval-technology online magazine (Naval-technology 2019) L-3 MAPPS’s 
IPMS have been delivered to multiple customers, including US Navy, German Navy, UK 
Royal Navy and French Navy. Even if the information from this kind of marketing material 
must be taken cautiously it could be stated that there are multiple navies using IPMS in 
at least some of their ships. 
HMS Queen Elizabeth is the newest class of aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy. She is 
a 280 m long with displacement of 65 000 tonnes. While powered by two Rolls-Royce 
MT30 gas turbines providing over 70 MW and four diesel generators providing 40 MW 
she can reach speeds up to 32 knots. The range can be up to 10 000 nautical miles. She 
can accommodate the maximum of around 50 aircrafts including helicopters and F35 
stealth fighter-bombers. The initial operational capability should be reached by the end 
of 2020. (Allison, 2017; Royal Navy, 2019.) 
HMS Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers have been designed for lean manning and 
IPMS is one part of this design. These aircraft carriers have 20 % of the crew of the US 
Nimitz Class even though they are 60 % of the size. The access to the IPMS is handled 
by 65 IPMS operator stations and 12 IPMS laptops which all have full access to the 
system. Systems fully integrated into IPMS are Electrical Power Control and 
Management System (EPCAMS), Machinery Control and Surveillance (MCAS), Damage 
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Surveillance (DSAC), Condition Monitoring (CM) and Platform Onboard Trainer (POBT). 
In HMS Queen Elizabeth IPMS is working on restricted and secret internal networks. 
IPMS instance working on secret side is also connected to the Combat Management 
System (CMS). For the network IPMS is using 100 Mbps Ethernet / Internet protocol (IP) 
network and 1 Gbps bandwidth between nodes. (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
 
Figure 1, HMS Queen Elizabeth IPMS functional Diagram (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
HMS Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers are divided into five damage control zones. 
Each of these zones have IPMS control stations. This will give flexibility to the operators 
when they can use any of the control stations and they are not dependent on any singe 
control station. Each control station can work in standalone mode without connection to 
network or common servers and they are always kept synchronized. To increase the 
effective decision making common real time situational picture is always available on 
these control stations. (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
On HMS Queen Elizabeth the IPMS can display multiple different layers of information. 
The level of detail can be adjusted and live status from systems can be added to general 
arrangements style of overview. The operator can plan by directly drawing to the large 
screen displays and transmit those drawing to other IPMS consoles. System failures and 
action damage reports can be followed from the IPMS display, this permits fast exchange 
of operational priorities by prioritizing them to meet ships Command Aim. (Davies & 
Jewell, 2015) 
Kill Cards which informs the user what tasks need to be executed in different damage 
control situations are included in HMS Queen Elizabeth’s IPMS. There are up to 10 000 
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Kill Cards in the system, some of them allow semi-automatic or even fully automatic 
actions based on the situation.  (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
Individual IPMS control stations on the HMS Queen Elizabeth can be put on simulation 
mode even when the others are in real world mode. Full functionality of the system can 
be simulated. (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
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3 RECOGNIZED AREAS OF INTEREST 
This development work started from evaluating the status of different systems. Status in 
this case means how the systems are functioning in principle. How they are 
interconnected to other systems or are they stand alone. Could they benefit from 
information fed by some other system? Or could they provide valuable information to 
other systems. This overall picture was formed by interviewing system experts, naval 
architects and ship personnel. The names of the interviewees and memos of the 
interviews are saved but not released on this work. 
Five different main topics where identified during the preliminary assessment of this 
thesis.  
1. General requirements for IPMS, this topic will include general requirements 
related to the IPMS itself. 
2. Maintenance system, what features of IPMS could benefit the maintenance 
aspects of the ship 
3. Operational features, which features could make the crew’s life easier or advance 
the lean manning. 
4. Survivability, could some features of IPMS increase the ships survivability 
5. Testing, difficulties and how to mitigate integration risks 
Interviews conducted for this thesis where performed in free flow conversations without 
following exactly any scientific research method. Interviewees where asked questions 
like: are there any problem areas on current system automation or would some systems 
benefit from data provided by some other system. Quite interesting discussions where 
started by these questions. Typically, at first the interviewees where a bit puzzled why 
they are asked this kind of questions and there was a bit of change resistance towards 
the whole topic. But when common understanding was achieved on what this topic is all 
about, the attitudes changed a bit. Many of the answers reflected on past bad 
experiences of failed or somewhat problematic integrations. Many promises have been 
made by system suppliers in the past but still result may vary. Our organization is very 
lean manned, so the total amount of interviewed experts was only 7. A single person can 
be responsible for multiple different systems, so good coverage of different systems was 
still achieved. Interviews are numbered from 1 to 6 in references section. In interview 1 
there were two persons present. 
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The ideas proposed on this work are a combination from the interviews, outside sources 
and findings during this work.  
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4 FINDINGS 
4.1 General requirements for Integrated Platform Management System 
In some of the interview it was seen that IPMS should display information but not 
necessarily control everything. Some interviewees had the opinion that the connection 
between IPMS and other systems should be two way but with limitations. (Interviews 1, 
4 and 5, 2017.) The conclusion is that it should be carefully evaluated what features are 
really needed and give control for only those. 
The requirement repeated multiple times for different occasions was that the IPMS 
cannot be too complex. One fear was that for example fault tracing is going to be 
impossible if every system is integrated into one. Past experiences have shown that even 
in simple two system integrations totally irrelevant failures may reflect to operations. One 
interviewee mentioned that failure in autopilot system was causing issues in IAS system. 
(Interview 3 and 5, 2017, Interview 2 2019.)   
One interviewee was also concerned about the feeding and distributing of incorrect 
information. According to him it must be somehow prevented that only correct information 
can be passed along the system. (Interview 5 2017.)  This issue could probably be solved 
or limited by firewalls or filters which are capable of deep packet inspection if IP / Ethernet 
type network is used. 
One interviewed system expert was concerned about if some part of IPMS fails, it shall 
not affect the whole system or require a total reboot. (Interview 5 2017.)  It is obvious 
that startup and shutdown procedures should be free.  
If connection is lost every system shall function also as standalone without IPMS and 
manual override must be implemented. These two requirements also came up in 
interviews. (Interview 3, 4 and 5 2017, Interview 2 2019.)   
With high number of sensors how to detect if sensor is reading wrong, has failed or is 
completely missing? Reading not available (N/A) is a completely different thing than 
reading zero. This is easily solved if singe or few different sensor types are used. But in 
the case of full spec IPMS the number of different sensors can be high. Environmental 
requirements for the sensors must be considered carefully, which sensors must work 
submerged or which must stand extreme heat.  
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If the ship where an IPMS is installed is going to be classified there can be rules from 
the class society. For example DNV-GL Part 4 System and components, Chapter 9 
Control and monitoring systems give a good list of requirements for systems like the 
IPMS. Starting from classificating the IPMS, certificating different features, software 
development, testing, human interface design and lots of other details. (DNV-GL, 2015) 
In addition to the class society rules other requirements may rise depending on the 
platform and planned missions. On MHS Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier’s a 
maximum latency of two seconds for any input or output was required (Davies & Jewell, 
2015). This kind of requirement could increase the probability that the IPMS is displaying 
correct data and the control commands are going through. If typical office grade 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware with non-real-time operating systems are 
used, the latency is always a guess or calculated prediction. 
4.2 Maintenance system and logging 
In the interviews it was brought up that IPMS could show maintenance notifications, 
gather operating hours of different system and feed the maintenance system with this 
information. Currently engines are usually maintained according to usage time or just 
calendar. This centralized maintenance system could make the calculations but IPMS 
could show the alarm and forward the information to IAS system. For example from pump 
connected to IAS, IPMS gets the data and sends it to the centralized maintenance 
system. Some centralized maintenance systems can be interfaced to IAS. But IPMS 
could be a better node for this kind of complete maintenance system. IPMS could gather 
fault information from multiple different systems and sensors like fire alarm. (Interviews 
3, 4 and 5 2017) 
An area of interest was also logging of what systems have been used and how they have 
been used. This could help finding random looking faults and interference sources. In 
the IPMS there should be a tool to analyze this information. IPMS could have a lot wider 
knowledge about what is happening around the ship than compared to traditional IAS 
system. This should not only be for engine usage profiles but also other systems 
including combat system. Data should be automatically analyzed to find anomalies. 
Vibration and stretch measurements should probably be sent to shore for analysis. 
(Interviews 3, 4 and 5 2017) 
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Maintenance tablet with extensive connection points or with wireless connection to IPMS 
could help problem solving. The maintainer could stand next to the unit with issues and 
see sensor data or control the unit. Access to all data should be available when needed. 
According to the interviews on many currently used systems you can only access some 
features with laptop but not all. (Interviews 3 2017.) 
As stated by Dikis et.al. (2014) vibration monitoring is the most known and applied 
technique of condition monitoring. In MHS Queen Elizabeth permanent vibration 
transducers on approximately 200 rotating machines will be connected to IPMS and 
hand-held recorders can also be used. (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
 
Figure 2, Diesel Engine Components Case Study Model (Dikis et.al., 2014) 
In Inspection Capabilities for Enhanced Ship Safety (INCASS) project a case study was 
performed where main engine, engine block, cooling system and their failure modes 
were considered. The input for the analysis was historical data, expert input/judgement, 
oil analysis and live measurements from vibration or thermography sensors. All this 
information was processed through different tools in the INCASS framework and the 
result showed acceptable operational levels of reliability performance. (Lazakis et.al., 
2016.) 
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INCASS framework seems like a very sophisticated way of helping with condition-based 
maintenance. Such features could be a part of IPMS or at least it should be considered 
if IPMS could feed this kind of system with data.  
Real time logging of the whole ship needs accurate ship wide time synchronization. Also, 
the habit of making a note of the exact failure time is crucial if the IPMS is not able to 
detect the failure: Which systems were running and how when the failure occurred. 
Automatic checking of history if similar situations have happened and also checking if 
something failed at that time. 
IPMS system could be the system with most wide variety of sensors and access to all 
data gathered by other systems. This gathered data could be used to predict 
maintenance needs and isolate fault conditions. Also, this data can be an asset when 
developing new ships. High level of automation is needed as well as usage of specialized 
software or artificial intelligence type of applications. The amount of data is going to be 
so high that going through it manually can be too time-consuming task for humans.  
4.3 Operational features 
Operational features in the context of this thesis are including features which can be 
useful to maintenance or simplify usage of the platform. They may not necessarily 
increase survivability but can be helpful in other situations. 
4.3.1 Engine and propulsion control 
According to the interviews currently used machinery control systems or integrated 
automations systems (IAS) control a lot more than just machinery and propulsion. It was 
suggested that it could be reasonable to leave IAS as machinery and propulsion control 
system and move other features into the IPMS. It was also seen that IAS may not need 
much information from IPMS but could offer a lot of information for other systems. 
(Interview 5 2017) 
In the casualty of United States Ship (USS) McCain there was a lot of confusion on the 
steering and propulsion control (Department of the Navy, 2017). When the ship has lot 
of different control systems from different system suppliers, they may have different logic 
of how the user interface works. All of them tend to have their own style in the graphical 
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user interface (GUI) and every software has its bugs or features. Some interfaces can 
be very intuitive with one physical adjustment wheel while with some others can have 
hundreds of buttons in computer display and very little can be done without proper 
training. When you add all quirks and features to the mix it can be even too difficult for 
users to work in emergency situations without long experience on that exact system. In 
surprising situations like in the USS McCain the crew from another vessel was not 
completely familiar with all the features and mistakes were made. This can eventually 
lead to a situation where training of the crew in multiple different ships comes very difficult 
or impossible.   
With one system integrated to multiple different systems some benefits could be gained 
with common style of user interface. Similar symbols, similar arrangements in the GUI, 
similar look and feel of the system could make the operating of different ships safer. In 
MHS Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers the Machinery Control and Surveillance 
(MCAS) is integrated into IPMS (Davies & Jewell, 2015). There could also be some 
sense behind the Spanish Armadas decision to install the same IPMS in every ship and 
even retrofit the old ones (Defence SA Advisory Board, 2009). 
If very critical functions like engine, propulsion or steering control is added to a system 
like IPMS, it should also affect the reliability requirements for the IPMS. It should be very 
hard for the IPMS to lose control and even if the control is lost the backup systems must 
be ready to take control. On USS McCain when the control was changed from station to 
another. The value of requested rudder angle changed depending what was selected on 
the back up station before the control change (Department of the Navy, 2017). This kind 
of issues should be avoided and to avoid it there should be constant change of 
information between the backup system and primary. Of course, it should be considered 
if in some situations returning all values to default or zero is the best solution. 
Engine control from the IPMS could be only high-level commands. Start up, shutdown, 
combat override and engine speed can be enough in most of the cases. It is difficult to 
see any real added benefit from controlling very low-level engine parameters like fuel 
injection timing. This would add complexity and integration difficulty. Even these low-
level parameters could still be monitored. More information the IPMS is getting the better 
it can serve other systems like the centralized maintenance system. 
If the IPMS can record data, it could be made to learn from experience. When crew 
orders the machinery to do something, some other system should be prepared for this. 
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One example could be the power management system: when operator suddenly throws 
throttle from 0 to 100 and the electric motors start to eat power, what happens with the 
power production in total including the hotel load. Or calibrate constantly what  the correct 
pitch of the propeller is for any given situation to achieve least noise or best efficiency. 
4.3.2 Power management 
In interview 3 it was seen that a change of switchboard feed from A to B could be made 
in advance if it could be predicted that cable problems are going to occur. Feeds to most 
important parts like the combat system or propulsion should have high level of 
redundancy. (Interviews 3 2017) 
In the interviews it was seen that maybe power management system (PMS) could be a 
standalone system or part of IAS. The amount of running auxiliary engines should be 
controlled depending on the load. Also, it was seen that PMS should have interface to 
IPMS. (Interviews 4 and 5 2017) 
Each genset has a local operator panel (LOP) which could be used to override IPMS 
control. (Interviews 4 2017) On MHS Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers the Electrical 
Power Control and Management System (EPCAMS) is integrated into IPMS. In two 
positions there is still direct access to EPCAMS if IPMS has failed. (Davies & Jewell, 
2015) 
According to the interviews there are quite often questions about the quality of the 
electricity. Harmonic distortions, currents and other interferences should be monitored 
by the IPMS and sent to datalogger. This kind of power quality monitoring could greatly 
help with fault finding. (Interviews 4 and 5 2017) 
In one interview it was also proposed that isolation resistance measurement for 690V 
and 440V could be done by IPMS. In current systems the measured areas are quite large 
and higher resolution would be beneficial.  (Interviews 4 2017) 
If the IPMS is integrated with CMS, it could get information to evaluate where the ship is 
going to be hit to do necessary adjustments in advance. These pre-emptive measures 
cannot affect the combat systems in this very crucial moment, but they could increase 
the survivability of the ship. Power production related measurements could be done, for 
example electrical isolation of spaces or switchboard changes. 
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TEMPEST and RED/BLACK separation have been challenging designers for many 
years now. The codename TEMPEST has its initial roots in the WW2 when it was 
discovered that electrical emanations allowed secret information to be read from the 
ciphered side of a cryptographic device. Today TEMPEST is still a codeword for 
compromising electromagnetic radiation which can contain sensitive information. To 
avoid this radiation and interception of it, some design precautions must be made. 
RED/BLACK separation is strongly related to TEMPEST and the idea is to keep the 
signals containing secret data or audio in plain form from mixing with signals containing 
ciphered or unclassified signals. There are multiple TEMPEST related NATO standards 
for installation, equipment and testing to help with the design. But online testing is not 
that widely or openly discussed topic. Could IPMS be used to do online testing and 
monitor if red/black separation is still working at any given time? To make this work the 
IPMS should monitor the signals on the red (secret) side and compare this to the signals 
found on the black (unclassified) side. An other way could be resistance or attenuation 
measurements from different cablings like power or groundings. This would probably 
introduce security issues of its own but it could be done.  
With historical data IPMS could estimate what the ship’s performance is at any given 
time. During normal operations it can be verified if excessive power is needed compared 
to the speed and estimated hotel load. Ice load system could also be used as source or 
end point for data or it could be even fully integrated in to the IPMS. Also, if the ship is 
damaged, especially by complex battle damage, it may not be very clear what the ship’s 
capabilities currently are. Is there increase in drag, how much liquids were lost, how 
much power is available for propulsion or combat systems, what the maneuvering 
capabilities are or how much time there is before stability or power is lost. This 
information with environmental information such as maps and temperature could give 
indication where the ship should be moved for the safest anchoring or grounding or 
where the best chance is for the crew to survive if the ship will sink. Before this kind of 
system is implemented human reaction to non-survivable estimations should be 
considered. Should the system be positive till the end to avoid other human reactions 
due miscalculation. 
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4.3.3 Interior communications 
Modern integrated intercom and public address / general alarm systems are quite 
versatile. Data or audio interfaces can be integrated to multiple sources and one of those 
sources could be the IPMS.  
General alarms shall be sounded through the Public Access and General Alarm (PAGA) 
system. The actual alarm tone or sequence could be generated by the IPMS or intercom 
but probably the simplest option is the PAGA system. Audio interface between IPMS and 
PAGA would be simple for integration.  But what if one of those alarms needs to be 
launched somewhere else than in the IPMS control station? Intercom is one of the widest 
spread system around the ship, only electricity and lighting is more available. Current 
generation of intercom systems can offer the user the ability to initiate alarms from the 
intercom user terminals. They are connected by data to the PAGA systems and it will 
play the alarm requested by the intercom. It could be better that IPMS also initiates the 
alarm similarly by just giving information to PAGA system for which alarm to play. 
Using PAGA system for all alarms could also have a benefit of limiting the total amount 
of needed speakers on the ship. Redundant PAGA system is accepted by class society 
and a third layer of alarm speakers or bells may not be needed. 
Some intercom systems have the possibility to add wireless handheld devices to the 
network. Some of these solutions are based on COTS smart phones connected to a ship 
wide wireless network. From IPMS point of view this could be one way of sending 
information and receiving information. For example machinery alarms or status 
information could be directed to the device used by the chief engineer.   
If the ship is fitted with info TV -system it should be connected to IPMS to automatically 
display alarm information. 
Many of the accident reports addressed in chapter 5 mentioned the difficulty to count the 
crew. Intercom devices connected to IPMS could provide a way to report your status and 
position directly to the system. There are probably better dedicated systems for this but 
it could be an alternative solution. 
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4.3.4 Lighting control 
IPMS could take control of the lighting system of the ship. On naval ships there is a need 
for different presets for different operational conditions. Brown or red lights are commonly 
used inside the ship during dark hours. Deck lights are usually off but if they are on there 
can still be limitations to what kind of light is allowed. During dark time missions’ 
operators using night vision goggles may not be blinded while the crew who is not using 
night vision goggles (NVG) should still see something. Controlling these aspects from 
IPMS could limit mistakes especially if they can cause life threatening accident or 
decrease the survivability.  
On USS Fitzgerald survivors from the flooded berthing said that only the combat lanterns 
system was steering them to the right direction (Department of the Navy, 2017). If the 
lighting system controlled by IPMS has ability to control single light or small groups of 
lights, they could provide guidance to safety. This would mean that the IPMS system 
should have complete situational picture and capability to assess the situation or present 
the situation for the crew to aid decision making.  
If the lighting system is sophisticated enough light color and intensity could change 
depending on location of light source. Light closer to the exits would be closest to outside 
conditions while light deep inside the ship would be whatever is needed. This may be a 
bit of a luxury type of feature and not much effort should be put to it. But if the lighting 
system allows this kind of light manipulation, there could be slight advantages to be 
gained.  
Even if modern warships will detect each other in mainly non optical way, the lighting can 
still affect the detectability of the vessel. Hybrid threats are still existing and often this 
kind of warfare includes usage of old weaponry which may be based on optical detection 
and aiming with human eyes. To increase survivability against these hybrid threats some 
old school World War 2 (WW2) era tactics could be implemented with ship lightning. For 
example usage of deck lights to make it difficult to estimate heading or using certain 
patterns of light so the ship would match fishing boats or similar.  
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4.3.5 Electromagnetic environment 
Depending on the top side design there may be areas which are not safe for personnel 
when some radio frequency transmitters are used. Radiation from them is usually not 
visible for human eyes and cannot be immediately felt. Sensors could be used to 
measure the field strength and alert nearby users of the possible danger. If field strength 
sensors are not feasible, data of used transmitters could be got from CMS or 
Communications (COMMS) system to make an estimation of which areas are not safe. 
Or a cheap solution could be manual Radiation Hazard (RADHAZ) indicator on entrances 
to these hazardous areas. 
There could be spaces on the ship which are ATmosphères EXplosives (ATEX) spaces 
or have other similar restrictions only during very specific circumstances. For example 
when handling some material or refueling onboard equipment. Some limitations for 
equipment inside those areas could be considered. These limitations could be controlled 
by IPMS or the IPMS could be used to sense when the atmospheric condition is suitable 
for explosion and automatically shut down equipment which could possibly ignite the 
mixture.  
Especially in small ships there are situations where it is possible to cause interference to 
your own systems by using your own transmitters or even interference to other electrical 
equipment. COMMS and CMS should take care of their own equipment, but usage of 
ship systems could also be interfered. For example on some vessels the effect of high 
frequency (HF) transmission can be seen in machinery instruments or heard from PA 
system, both features are not desired. IPMS could be used to identify and track these 
kinds of problems. Interfacing IPMS to COMMS or CMS could give the information which 
transmitters were transmitting when the problem occurred. Open hatches can cause the 
field strength rise in unexpected spaces but if the IPMS has the hatch monitoring and 
logging it is not an issue to find isolation to the problem. 
Also, sensors connected to the IPMS can be affected by interference. Especially if there 
are hundreds of sensors all around the ship it can be very difficult to notice these errors. 
Even if someone is directly observing the value, how can it be known what the reality is. 
These kinds of errors can be caused by radio transmissions when they happen on 
specific frequency with specific antenna. Usually the transmission made by naval ships 
are not long in duration, some can be few seconds while some others change frequency 
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over 70 000 times in one second. In the worst case these seemingly unknown issues in 
sensors can hamper crews’ trust to the whole system or even aid to make misjudgments 
of current situation. 
4.3.6 Bridge systems 
As a disclaimer interviews related to this topic were made with machinery and navigation 
systems engineers from FDF and with a system expert representing a marine electronics 
company.   
According to the interviews in commercial ships information is usually gathered to the 
bridge and shown on centralized conning display. Usually in commercial ships this is 
only for display without any control. Conning display has a direct connection to IAS and 
it can display current status information and even alarms initialized by IAS. There is not 
always need for deep integration via data, simple dry contacts can be used to receive 
alarm information. From the conning display some of the alarms can be acknowledged 
or cleared with limitations set by the class society rules. Class societies have rules how 
and where the alarms must be shown, acknowledged and cleared. (Interviews 1 2017.) 
According to the representative of the marine electronics company in the products they 
are supplying there is no limit to how many input/output (I/O) -boards can be added. 
These I/O-boards can be used to interface sensors or systems to get information and 
even control other systems. Systems they are providing are highly software based and 
they can be modified in flexible way. They see that on the bridge there is no need for 
IPMS displays or control stations. Everything needed can be done from conning display. 
(Interviews 1 2017.) 
In other interviews it was seen that conning displays are only for display purposes without 
any control and they should probably stay that way. Experiences from integration issues 
related to bridge systems and IAS have left some skepticism on how well conning display 
would function in the role of IPMS. In the past these kind of integration issues have left 
some features completely missing on some ships. (Interviews 3 2017) 
One highly critical system which sometimes falls into the gray area between combat 
systems and bridge systems is the time distribution. Many of the combat or 
communications systems are depending on very accurate time and may have 
unforeseen consequences with wrong time. Also if IPMS is to be used for detecting 
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problems which may have a duration of milliseconds, it is quite impossible to find the 
right time on the logs without accurate time synchronization. Big problem with time is 
how to keep it synchronized with other ships. Misaligned time between ships is usually 
no problem for ship systems but on especially COMMS side it can be critical. Currently 
quite popular way of getting synchronized time is to use Global Positioning System 
(GPS) signal to set the clocks. The problem with GPS is that it can be jammed or altered 
with relatively simple and cheap systems. Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
with anti-jam antennas and M-code receivers could be used to improve the situation but 
still it is important to keep the ships’ time correct when signals from satellites are not 
available. One solution presented by navigation systems expert is to have time servers 
with highly accurate internal clock in free running mode most of the time. These could be 
connected to antennas or other time source only during recognized situation. (Interview 
6 2019.) IPMS could be used to switch the ship between actively sync to free running 
mode via integration to the time servers. IPMS could also follow the time difference 
between the ship’s internal time and the time received from external source.  
4.4 Survivability 
Survivability can be divided into three subcategories. Susceptibility, vulnerability and 
recoverability. Susceptibility describes how easy it is for the ship to get damaged by 
environmental, enemy or other factors. Vulnerability tells how well ship can withstand 
damage, how many zones can be flooded or how well the machinery is separated. 
Recoverability is more difficult to evaluate because the abilities of the crew are also 
considered, as well as supporting systems like firefighting or dewatering. 
In many ways modern warships are more vulnerable than their WW2 era predecessors. 
Lack of armor, dependence on sensitive sensors, adoption of commercial equipment and 
standards together with other cost savings have all increased vulnerability. (Piperakis, 
2013.)   
Past experiences and survivability analyses have shown multiple enhancements in 
design rules, including concentrating, separating and duplicating systems, ship 
separation to semiautonomous zones and damage detectors. (Piperakis, 2013). All of 
these could possibly be increased with IPMS.  
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Susceptibility could be increased by making the ship more difficult to detect. Heat from 
the exhaust or other systems could be cooled. Noise, especially underwater, could be 
limited with smart control of running equipment or adjusting their settings. Exterior 
hatches should be monitored to limit increase in radar cross-section (RCS) via open 
ones. Vulnerability can increase if all hatches are monitored or controlled and 
precautions are made if enemy engagement is imminent. As stated by Piperatkis (2013) 
recoverability is the most difficult to model because of crew actions and time decencies. 
Still increasing recoverability could be done by providing the crew with better situational 
picture, informative interface for system control, decision support tools like kill cards and 
automated damage control methods.  
According to Piperatkis (2013) there are no single survivability assessment tools taking 
into account all aspects needed on early stage designs. Changes benefitting survivability 
like system placement or ship compartmentation can be very difficult to implement at 
later design stages. (Piperatkis, 2013).  
Assessing of survivability values is not a simple task and high level of though should be 
put on how to weight the results to provide values suitable for the specific project. 
Piperatkis (2013) project assessessed five combat ships, three different frigates, one 
corvette and one destroyer. In his work trimaran frigate was the best in vulnerability 
assessment followed by destroyer and corvette. In recoverability assessment trimaran 
frigate was once again the best platform while mono hull frigates and the destroyer were 
close to each other. Susceptibility was best in destroyer followed by the corvette design 
and trimaran frigate. (Piperatkis, 2013). 
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Figure 3, Star Plot of Survivability for the Three Frigate Designs (Piperatkis, 2013). 
Frigate variant 1 is a baseline typical modern design, Frigate variant 2 is having two 
passing deck hull and minimal superstructure, Frigate variant 3 is a trimaran design. 
When deciding what kind of features IPMS should have similar method could be used 
as Piperatkis (2013) in his project even if it is difficult to predict what the condition and 
the capability of the crew are. It could be estimated how the crew will get the information, 
how they are commanded, which systems the crew should use and how much time it 
takes to use them. This could reveal some problem points where the IPMS design could 
concentrate on.  
4.4.1 Video surveillance 
In the interviews it was seen that different branches on the ship have different 
expectations from video surveillance. Bridge, Machinery Control Room (MCR), Combat 
Information Centre (CIC) and security control all need different camera angles. Of course 
some can be combined and turning cameras can improve the situation. In MCR, IPMS 
could be used to automatically show video feed from the alarm source with related 
information overlaid. (Interviews 3, 4 and 5 2017.) If the video system can make analysis 
on the picture, it could detect abnormal events like smoke, leak, fire or movement taking 
place and trigger an alarm to the IPMS. If picture recognition is capable enough, it could 
track where people have been seen and where they have gone to help finding the 
missing crew. Thermal cameras could also be considered to detect rise or lowering of 
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heat and to steer the damage control teams to the origin of smoke. In one interview it 
was stated that experience has proved turning of cameras very important during damage 
control. (Interviews 3 2017.) To limit switching between different systems like video 
surveillance control and IPMS the camera control could be integrated to IPMS.  
4.4.2 Platform resource coordination 
Sensor and weapon resource management has probably been a hot topic since the very 
early days of naval warfare. The question has been how to effectively use sensors and 
weapons in different platforms belonging to the same squadron. Which ship of the 
squadron has the best sensor and most effective weapon for the threat expected or 
detected. With fast moving targets like missiles or fighter aircraft the roles inside the 
squadron must be flexible and decisions must be made in short time period. The benefits 
of this kind of coordination have been described in multiple articles, papers and studies. 
Johnson and Green (2002) are describing sensor and resource coordination payoffs 
which can include increased battle space picture accuracy, decreased battle force 
reaction time and optimized resource usage.  
Even if sensors and weapon coordination are a widely discussed topic, I was unable to 
obtain papers, articles or studies considering platform resource coordination. Simple 
platform status messages are implemented in some tactical data links like Link 16 or Link 
22, but more specific ones seem to be non-existing in tactical level. The idea behind 
platform status coordination is that if the ship has been in an accident or has sustained 
damage due to enemy engagement, could then more detailed status benefit other ships 
in the the same squadron or even command and control stations on land.  
During Costa Concordia accident the master did not give information to the company 
Designated Person Ashore (DPA) about the seriousness of the situation. Even when the 
master had information that four compartments were flooding and the ship can withstand 
only flooding of two adjacent main compartments. The master also gave information to 
Coast Guard Operations Room that the ship was floating and maneuvering when the 
ship was grounded without propulsion or rudder control. Only after Maritime Rescuer 
Sub Centre (MRSC) Livorno solicited the “Abandon ship order” was given through the 
PA system. The situation of the ship was quite clear for the Search and Rescue (SAR) 
units when the bridge was evacuated but the situation of the onboard passengers and 
crew was not.  (MIT, 2012.) 
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If the DPA or MRSC would have known the real situation, they could have made the 
master to call the abandon ship sooner. According to the investigation report (MIT, 2012) 
if the emergency would have been launched few minutes after the master got the report 
that three WT compartments where flooded, all passengers could have been evacuated 
before the ship listed over 30°. The problem in this case was the master who was not 
giving correct information, so the MRSC did not know the real situation. Direct data 
connection via satellite, HF or V/UHF from IPMS to shore could provide the necessary 
information for the on-shore facilities to better evaluate the situation or even run 
simulations to support the ship crew. Picture from the ship video surveillance system 
could also benefit finding the passengers, especially if crew has already abandoned the 
ship. In the Costa Concordia case the ship had a blackout and did not have enough 
redundancy to keep critical systems running, only internal communications and bridge 
were working on UPS power. To properly utilize this kind of data connection redundant 
IPMS installation with its own sensors a backup power is needed. Data connection alone 
is useless without reliable information gathered from the ship. 
On Naval ships similar situations may occur. If the ship is engaged by conventional or 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, the crew might not be able 
to perform or normal communications methods are unavailable even if the ship is still 
afloat. Naval ships usually have CBRN filters and over pressure system but it may not 
be enough especially if due to enemy actions there are extra holes on the ship. In these 
kinds of cases automatic transmission of the ship status could be valuable information 
for the squadron or other supporting units. Is support needed, when the support must 
arrive, what kind of support, where the support should be given or is the only task to pick 
up possible survivors from the sea.  
In case of CBRN weapons the ship can be contaminated so that prolonged stay or 
entering inside is not possible. An ability to monitor the ship systems for safety could be 
the best option. Of course Emission Control (EMCON) status must be evaluated. If such 
transmissions are allowed to be made, it should not always be automatic. Strong 
encryption is also needed to not let the enemy make Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
from this transmission. Probably an Identification, friend or foe (IFF) style integrator and 
transponder system could be used in conjunction with broadcast in distress mode.  
If this concept of remote status is taken even further, also remote control could come into 
question. Benefits could be limited but technically there should be very little limitations. 
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Remotely operated aerial or underwater vehicles are quite common these days. Full size 
naval ship is of course a more demanding and complex machine but it could be done.  
Guidelines on operational information for masters in case of flooding in passenger ships 
are describing shore-based support system with two-way communication link, SOLAS 
regulation II-1/8-1.3.1.2 (IMO, 2018). It has a good list of needed inputs, calculating 
methods and outputs, these of course are the same for onboard stability computers. For 
the two-way communication link there are no guidelines or requirements and this may 
leave room for subpar implementations. 
4.4.3 Hatch monitor and control 
Hatch, gate, door or valve status can be very critical in many situations onboard a ship. 
Changing this status, especially ship wide changes, can always lead to a human error 
and one hatch, door or valve will be left open. In emergency water, combat gas or other 
substance may pass through the open hatch and severely affect the survivability of the 
ship and crew. Monitoring if something is closed or open is trivial with modern 
technology. But spreading that to the whole ship in every water or gas tight hatch, door 
and valve, which many be very different from each other, may be a costly task. Even if 
the hatch is monitored in the event of damaged ship, it could be difficult to monitor if the 
hatch, door or valve has been damaged and is not functioning anymore. There could be 
an additional sensor with the status sensor to detect if water is entering through, with gas 
it might be more difficult due to its more complex behavior.  
Controlling of the doors, gates, hatches and valves is a bit more difficult than just 
monitoring the status. They must be manually operable during equipment malfunctions 
while the motors or hydraulics must still be strong enough to close them safe way in 
various situations. Remote controllable valves, hydraulic water tight doors or gates, like 
stern gates, are nothing new and making them powered should not be an issue. Doors 
and hatches inside the ship will need more sophisticated solutions, especially if they are 
remotely controlled from place without direct line of sight. Damage to people or 
equipment caught during closing or opening should be avoided. Video surveillance 
system feed from the door or hatch about to be controlled could be automatically shown 
to avoid these kinds of accidents. Still the closing system on the hatch needs to be strong 
enough so it could help in situations like on USS Fitzgerald where the crew was unable 
to close it due to the force of water (Department of the Navy, 2017).  
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For an IPMS system hatch, door, gate and valve monitoring is an important feature. The 
status of those opening can greatly affect any given situation. Decision support tools may 
have real difficulty to work without this information. Controlling could help recoverability 
during damage control situation especially if some of the controlled openings are in 
inaccessible space because of damage or flooding. Breach on firemains has been an 
issue in multiple cases like HMS Sheffield and USS Stark. (Loss of HMS Sheffield – 
Board of inquiry, 1982; Department of Defense, 1987). In these cases some time could 
have been gained with automatically controlled valves. 
Depending on the ship design exterior hatch status can greatly affect the RCS of the 
ship. In emergency it could be useful to increase the RCS while during wartime it should 
be usually minimized. By having the hatch status on IPMS it could also inform the combat 
system which side of the ship has now increased RCS. 
4.4.4 Heat, ventilation and air conditioning 
According to the interviews heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system in 
current Finnish Navy (FN) ships can be interfaced to IAS but it was seen that no system 
can ever totally replace manual adjustments on the ventilation. But still integration to 
IPMS was seen as the future way to go. (Interviews 3, 4 and 5 2017.) 
If IPMS is connected to HVAC system and can control it, there might be ways to increase 
the ships survivability. In some of the damage control cases described in chapter 5, 
heavy smoke was the major issue affecting visibility and making damage control 
activities a lot more difficult. With the help of HVAC system capabilities IPMS could limit 
the ventilation in spaces where it is not currently needed and use that performance to 
help with smoke clearing. Also fire could be slowed down by limiting the air it can have. 
If fire is detected, all ventilation to that space could be stopped and hatches closed. Or if 
the space in unmanned, tightly sealed and HVAC system has the power, could vacuum 
be used to put out or slow the fire? 
In one interview it was discussed if HVAC system is damaged and its performance 
limited.  Could IPMS try to prioritize between crew and different equipment which require 
ventilation most or what is the best way to increase survivability on current situation? For 
example in hostile situations it might be best for the ship to keep combat system and 
machinery cool, while the crew can sweat a bit.  (Interviews 3 2017.) 
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In HMS Queen Elizbeth the IPMS is including kill cards. Some actions can be initiated 
from the kill cards displayed by the IPMS. Some kill cards can automatically take actions, 
like stopping ventilation when fire is detected without the need of user input. (Davies & 
Jewell, 2015) 
In interviews it was stated that over pressure system protecting against CBRN weapons 
should also be monitored by IPMS. Air quality should be monitored after the filters and if 
a problem occurs alert should be raised and the problematic unit immediately stopped. 
This would limit the risk of getting unwanted gases inside the ship through damaged or 
faulty filtering. Also, according to the interviews if one CBRN filtration unit goes down, 
others must work as backup. The status and control of hatches and valves is also critical 
to succeed in over pressure and to avoid contamination. (Interviews 3 and 4 2017.) 
In the interviews also oxygen and carbon monoxide level were seen as important 
features. In current ships oxygen level monitoring has been connected to fire alarm 
system but sometimes there have been issues with this integration. It was seen that 
IPMS should have monitoring capability for each room and possible alarms should be 
given first to the room, not the whole ship. (Interviews 3 and 4 2017.) 
4.4.5 Stability calculation 
According to the interviews stability calculations made by stability computer should in  
future ships be readily available. Stability situation should be available in the damage 
control centers and consoles. Currently all Finnish Navy ships have instructions on paper 
of what to do in a few specific situations. In the interviews it is was seen that software 
should be used to calculate each situation in real time and give recommendations for 
what to do. This feature will not take too long or add any real value. (Interviews 2, 3 and 
5 2017.) 
In interviews it was also seen that ice accretion should be monitored. Monitoring by 
sensors or calculated from ship movements was proposed in interviews. (Interviews 3 
2017.) Maybe also video surveillance system could be used to estimate the ice build-up 
optically. Helicopter deck could be heated to limit the ice build-up and to make it safer 
for helicopter operations. (Interviews 3 2017.) 
According to the interviews currently installed onboard stability computers need manual 
input of the amount of flooding or water used for firefighting. In current solutions only 
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tanks are measured and even that can sometimes have problems. When the ship is level 
IAS and has onboard stability computer, which both have their own sensors, they are 
usually very well aligned on the tank status. In other than completely level situations 
there can be a slight difference of the measured values. This might be due to sensor 
calibration or just different type of sensors behaving differently. Currently there are no 
sensors to automatically measure the cargo situation. Laying mines, dropping depth 
charges, shooting missiles, using guns or helicopter place on board must be manually 
input into the stability computer if it is seen necessary. In the interviews this was seen as 
easily predicted task and it is simple to input this data to the stability computer. 
(Interviews 2 2017.) 
In the future, flooding sensors should feed information to stability computer. In the 
interviews it was seen that status of water tight hatches, vents and doors must be 
monitored and the system should give alarms if they are open. The most critical hatches 
should also be controlled. In the interviews it came up that during emergency most of the 
crew effort can go to stopping the flooding, putting out the fire or other damage control 
actions. Experienced crews have a good feeling about the stability of the ship but it could 
still be helpful if the stability computer could automatically display current situation and 
show how it is proceeding. If the flooding cannot be stopped right away or fire control 
needs excessive amount of water, it should be calculated if the dewatering systems are 
still operational and have enough capacity. IPMS or stability computer could give 
recommendation for the ship’s trim or list of how to set the tanks if they are functional. 
One interviewed system expert saw that all stability related estimations or decision 
supporting information are very difficult to calculate accurately in real world with different 
sea conditions. It was also discussed that no ship is sailing with stability computer. 
Stability computer is a good tool to aid but in the end the commanding officer has the 
responsibility. The crew must have a gut feeling of the ship. (Interviews 2, 3 and 5 2017.) 
Direct translation of Finnish to English quotion from the interview 2, 
“Reality always differs from calculations and you can never achieve the 
accuracy of a single kilo or even tonnes”.  
This previous quotation leads us to Costa Concordia accident report where it was found 
that the simulation software used after the accident underestimated the heeling to be 6⁰ 
less than in reality. Accident report also states that the stability computer was unable to 
monitor flooding, control equipment or make estimations based on breach size or 
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flooding time. Recommendations on that report include installation of stability computer 
with connection flooding detectors. (MIT, 2012.) 
On HMS Queen Elizbeth class aircraft carriers IPMS is getting information from multiple 
sources like from tank fluid level sensors, aircraft weight and position, damage and flood 
information. This makes it possible to display real time stability information on the IPMS 
control stations. (Davies & Jewell, 2015) 
If the ship has received damage, battle or other, it might be difficult to assess which 
spaces are still watertight. This will greatly affect predictions on what will happen when 
the flooding progresses. Maybe HVAC system could be utilized to measure “tightness” 
of the spaces and cross reference with historical intact data. 
4.4.6 Noise 
From specifications sheets, like the Wärtsilä 20DF product guide, it can be estimated 
what noise and vibration levels the units are producing. For example the Wärtsilä 
8L20DF is producing air borne noise level of 118 dBA when at full load and nominal 
speed. Sound power is depending a bit on the frequency. (Wärtsilä, 2018) The total 
acoustic signature of the vessel can be difficult or impossible to predict accurately but it 
can be measured. A simple list of systems which can be used when silence is needed 
can be formed. But if more flexibility is needed, system like the IPMS should know or 
measure live the noise level and frequency caused by each component. Based on that 
information IPMS could control machinery within the given noise limit. Not just shutting 
down pre planned equipment but using the flexible way that is needed while keeping 
noise below the limit required by current operation. Also if the noise signature can be 
altered, IPMS can make it more difficult for the enemy to form proper identification 
libraries or to make correct identification. Something could be done even if it might be 
impossible to make modern warship sound like Fiskari with Yanmar YSM8 single cylinder 
diesel engine. 
Noise measurement could also benefit maintenance and system condition monitoring. 
Even if according to Dikis et.al. (2014) vibration measurement is the most typical way of 
doing this, sound could also be used to find problems. Especially in moving machinery 
where permanent vibration sensors are impossible to implement. Big changes in sound 
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spectrum compared to when the ship was delivered may indicate faults and may even 
lower the susceptibility and that way affect the total survivability of the ship. 
4.4.7 Fire alarm 
In the interviews it was seen that fire alarm system and IPMS should be integrated. 
Especially if IPMS can control hatch, valves and the HVAC system. According to the 
interviews many of the currently installed fire alarm systems cannot display visually 
where the fire is located. Only the sensor number may be told by the system and then it 
is needed to be checked elsewhere where that sensor is ocated. If the crew on watch is 
following the IPMS display, the most relevant information for each alarm should be 
displayed automatically. Start of the damage control would be faster if space where the 
alarm has been triggered is clearly displayed in a ship GA drawing or similar. Together 
with this map display status of affecting hatches, status of ventilation and temperature of 
the space should be seen. (Interviews 3, 4 and 5 2017.) 
According to the interviews all rooms shall be temperature monitored and smoke density 
monitored. Also, IPMS system could add more automation to fire control. For example if 
the fire starts at the bow engine room, the system could automatically move all power 
generation to the aft engine room and close ventilation. Still it was seen that some actions 
must be manual, like filling ammunition magazines with water. Requirements for the 
sensors must be considered if they need to withstand heat or work after being 
submerged. (Interviews 3, 4 and 5 2017.) According to Zatrain (2010) on USS Stark 
where the temperature of the fire was around 1700 ⁰C, it might be difficult to have sensors 
and cabling which can withstand all possible situations. 
In incidents like USS Stark or HMS Sheffield thick smoke made it very difficult to find the 
source of fire. Augmented reality helmets with thermal cameras could make working in 
smoke more efficient. These helmets could receive real time updates from the IPMS to 
show real time sensor data.  On both USS Sark and HMS Sheffield firemains were also 
breached. If temporary firemains route is needed, IPMS could show where it needs to be 
routed and connected. 
On USS Stark so much water was used for firefighting that it started to affect stability. In 
the interviews it was also seen that the amount of water or foam or other firefighting 
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material used could be an interesting value for the stability computer. It could also be 
calculated what the ratio between dewatering and adding water is.  
4.4.8 Cyber security 
Cyber security has been a hot topic for a long time now. Still sometimes it feels that it is 
not taken very seriously unless you have systems which are connected to the Internet. 
Ship internal systems may fall to false sense of security when they are standalone 
systems. With the increase of Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
based networking, COTS hardware and operating systems the environment becomes 
very similar to everything else, like the Information Technology (IT) infrastructure of 
businesses or personal computers at homes. This makes attacks like malware able to 
infect ship systems even if it was not originally designed for ships. According to Baltic 
and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) sometimes intrusions can go undetected for 
years. On one incident a power management system which could be connected to 
Internet for diagnostics and updates had dormant worm waiting for this connection. It 
was believed that a visiting technician infected the system with Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) device. The worm had been in the system for over 2 years before it was detected. 
(BIMCO, 2018.) 
There are a few different guidelines or recommendations available for handling cyber 
security on ships. BIMCO “The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships” and DNV-
GL “Cyber security resilience management for ships and mobile offshore units in 
operation” both documents have similar idea of addressing the cyber security issue by 
evaluating the risks first. This process should include finding out the threats, how they 
are prevented, what happens if an attack is successful and how it can be recovered from 
the attack. These documents are of course made mainly for commercial ships but most 
of it is applicable for naval ships also. (DNV-GL, 2016; BIMCO, 2018.) 
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Figure 4, Cyber security assessment sequence (DNV-GL, 2015) 
DN-GL and BIMCO documents both have different kinds of platform management 
systems included in their possible vulnerable systems lists. An IPMS should also be 
evaluated thoroughly as it falls clearly into this category. IPMS could be one main target 
for cyber-attack, it is centralized system where access to multiple different systems can 
be achieved. Or the IPMS could be used to take control of some critical features at crucial 
time. The IPMS should not be connected to Internet. Even if Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) tunnel or similar encryption method is used, it must be considered what is the risk 
of someone taking control of it are. 
For this thesis very light open source surface scratchs to two possible targets for cyber-
attack were considered, diesel engine and stability computer. These may or may not be 
main targets, but these were selected as examples.  
In normal situation cyber-attack to stability computer could have a slight effect to the 
mission of the ship. If the chief engineer has any clue what he is doing, there is very little 
risk even if the stability computer must be shutdown. (Interviews 2 2019.) On current 
ships effects are also limited because of the standalone arrangements. But if the stability 
computer would be integrated to IPMS and the IPMS would have the rights to 
automatically start actions to restore stability, in this case attack to stability computer 
could have more impact. These effects could be limited with redundancy or by having 
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backup storage drive for the stability computer or even a full backup computer detached 
from network when not needed. Also, some of the sensors used by the stability computer 
should be doubled up with sensors connected straight to IPMS for reference. Data or 
status information in the stability computer could be more interesting for the enemy. 
Especially when conventional engagement happens beyond the line of sight it can be 
difficult to assess the weapon effectiveness. Huge cloud of smoke could give some 
information but it can also be used for misleading purposes. But if data from stability 
computer could be sent off the ship, it could provide valuable information for BDA.  
Diesel engines have multiple ways they can fail or be made to fail, only few are touched 
here. 
In diesel engines thermal shock or fatigue from repeated thermal shocks can cause the 
cylinder liner to crack. (Bocchetti et.al. 2009.) Fonte et.al. (2015) are listing some root 
causes of marine diesel engines failures. This list includes loss off lubrication, over 
speeding of engines and engine power imbalance caused by incorrect monitoring. Most 
subtle attacks could be directed towards parts which are known to fail most frequently. 
On chart presented by Perakis et.al. (1990) fuel oil injection system was found to be the 
most common reason of failure on marine diesel engines (Banks et.al., 2001). An attack 
causing problems to known failure points could stay unnoticed for a long period of time 
and no engine type or ship class wide investigation would start immediately. 
If the attack must be accurately timed and not based on long term fatigue damage 
happening at random time, more rapid failure modes must be considered. Engine status 
monitoring could have additional redundancy from standalone sensors or gauges to limit 
the risk of singe sensor showing wrong values. But if the failure process is fast enough 
it could be a difficult task for the crew to notice this difference and take action before the 
failure happens. For example in case of Wärtsilä W20DF if the UNIC C3 system is 
compromised the attacker could potentially stop the lubrication system or cause cylinder 
over pressure, or just give wrong information to the ESM module. This will normally lead 
to alerts on the IAS and cause immediate shutdown of the engines (Wärtsilä, 2018).  In 
combat situation this could leave the ship into a very vulnerable state, conventional 
attacks could now have higher chance of success to inflict more permanent damage. If 
more permanent damage is needed without usage of traditional weapons, also the 
monitoring features of MCM and ESM modules of the Wärtsilä W20DF UNIC C3 system 
should be put to state where it is not showing real values or giving alarms and only the 
eventual engine failure would alert the crew (Wärtsilä, 2018).   
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Figure 5, Wärtsilä UNIC C3 engine control system architecture for diesel engines 
(Wärtsilä, 2018) 
IPMS could provide an additional layer of protection by introducing its own sensors and 
shutdown method to the engines. This would increase the difficulty of successful cyber-
attack if two or more completely different systems must be affected at the same time. If 
latencies are kept on the level of HMS Queen Elizabeth class IPMS, the system could 
have a chance to react before permanent damage will happen.  
If one would put the tin foil hat tightly on the head and read through the USS Fitzgerald, 
USS McCain and HNoMS Helge Ingstad incident reports, the question could rise whether 
the navigation systems have been compromised so that when surface track is observed 
to be in collision course it will be hidden from the screens? According to BIMCO (2018) 
Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) systems have had few known 
incidents. This is probably not the case in these two but it could be vicious way of trying 
to sink ships during peace time.  
4.5 Testing of the system 
Even if standards like Allied Quality Assurance Publications (AQAP) 2110 which expect 
high level or risk management and documentation are followed still in the end, only 
testing the system will prove the final status. In multi contract situations it may not be 
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easy to detect the responsibilities who will plan and execute the testing, or who is 
responsible if the test fails. AQAP 2131 gives a simple answer to testing, all testing and 
inspections to demonstrate the system shall be performed by the system supplier. 
Buyer’s responsibilities may not be released with this, especially if information, 
equipment or other assets are provided by the buyer or third party. 
First risk for this kind of system which interconnects to multiple systems provided by 
other supplies should be the interfaces. Who will provide the interface control 
documentation (ICD) and who will adapt to it? Can the ICD be fixed or is the development 
still ongoing? Who is responsible for the testing and when? To mitigate these risks proper 
interface testing should happen as soon as possible from the start of the project. Not 
only the official acceptance tests but also testing during development to catch errors in 
documentation, physical interfaces or bugs in software.  
Usage of middleware standards like Data Distribution Service (DDS) or Common Object 
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) could mitigate some risks of the integration. 
Usage of these is recommended by US Navy’s Open Architecture Computing 
Environment for defense systems (Eryiğit & Uyar, 2008). 
During contract negotiations testing should be considered carefully. Two simple solution 
to lower the risk of problems in interfaces could be to make the IPMS supplier provide 
interface test tools to other system provider, or vice versa. If adequate simulators or 
interface devices are delivered to IPMS supplier, it could greatly benefit the IPMS factory 
acceptance test (FAT). A sensor which are read by simple analog to digital converter 
(ADC) can be easily simulated but if something more complex like proprietary or even 
standard bus interface is used it is more demanding and should be tested as early as 
possible in the project. 
Interface simulators or real interface equipment are a good option whenever possible. 
Without them testing during development and in FAT could be very difficult. In any case, 
if real test with interfaces to ship systems is taking place in Setting to Work (STW) or 
Harbour Acceptance Test (HAT) phase, major delays are to be expected. According to 
Davies & Jewell (2015) on the HMS Queen Elizabeth class program hardware from the 
second ship was used on shore integration facility (SIF) to mitigate the risk of integration 
problems and to make STW go fluently. Early integration was also endorsed in interface 
testing with the OEM support at the SIF or at OEM’s site. Flaws were found on almost 
all the interfaces tested in the early integration tests. (McKelvie & Lakey, 2018) 
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During design phase displayed units and proper values are to be defined. Simple things 
like temperature measurements may cause confusion. If usage of Système international 
d'unités (SI) units is required, should the temperature readings be in kelvins or degrees 
Celsius? What happens when sensor readings are off the scale or what happens when 
sensor reading is not available, is 0 and N/A same or different thing? In the end the 
system must be logical, easy to use, but still informative. All these things come more 
important when the crew is fatigued, stressed or when ship is used in hostile and 
probably life threating situations. If the crew is expected to trust the IPMS and make 
decisions from the information, it requires that it must be tested to adequate level. 
On HMS Queen Elisabeth program HMS Albion is used as trial platform for some 
features (Davies & Jewell, 2015). As stated by McKelvie & Lakey (2018) the best 
feedback for the system design was received from the watchkeepers who use system 
daily. It was also observed unsurprisingly that harbor test did not tell the whole truth. 
After the sea trials more than 17 000 changes were made to alarms and warnings which 
behaved differently in the sea than in harbor. (McKelvie & Lakey, 2018.) The importance 
of proper sea acceptance test (SAT) is often overlooked on systems which should not 
be affected by the movement of the ship. Especially naval ships with complex 
electromagnetic environments (EME) relying only on HAT can be a costly decision. 
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5 COULD INTEGRATED PLATFORM MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM AFFECT THE OUTCOME 
5.1 USS Fitzgerald collision with ACX Crystal 
USS Fitzgerald is an Arleigh Burke Class destroyer which collided with container ship 
ACX Crystal on 17th of June 2017. Both ships were sailing at straight line for the past 30 
minutes before the collision. Neither of the ships took any action to avoid the contact until 
one minute before the collision when it was already too late. Port side of ACX Crystals 
bow hit the starboard side of USS Fitzgerald. Bulbous bow of the container ship 
penetrated to the starboard access trunk of the USS Fitzgerald. (Department of the Navy, 
2017.) 
 
Figure 6, Starboard side damage to USS Fitzgerald, (Department of the Navy, 2017.) 
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USS Fitzgerald was in material condition “modified ZEBRA”, Water tight doors and 
hatches were closed but scuttles on the hatches were open. 18 spaces were flooded due 
to the hole below waterline and there were no water tight doors or fixtures between them. 
13 spaces were flooded due to water tight barriers not being closed on time. 13 spaces 
were partially flooded due to ruptures in firemains and Aqueous Film-Forming Foam 
(AFFF) lines. Seven sailors were perished. (Department of the Navy, 2017.) 
In US Navy three different material conditions are specified. Condition X-RAY is used 
when there is no danger or e.g. when ship is at home base during normal working hours. 
During this time only doors and hatches labeled with black X should be kept closed. 
When the ship is at sea condition YOKE is set and all doors with black X or black Y are 
to be closed. During wartime or when in general quarters, condition ZEBRA is set. On 
condition ZEBRA all hatches and door with black X, black Y or red Z need to be closed. 
(Department of the Navy, 2019; Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1970.) 
 
Picture 1, Hatch with scuttle, marked with Z. (Department of the Navy, 2017.) 
Ship material condition “modified ZEBRA” and late call for general quarters were 
probably the main cause of flooding to some very critical spaces like combat system 
equipment room, radio center, radio transmitter room, sonar rooms and main engine 
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room 1. The idea behind this “modified ZEBRA” is to allow easier access through the 
ship but still have the ability for faster transition to ZEBRA, compared to the time it takes 
to transform from YOKE to ZEBRA. On the other hand, if the ship material condition had 
been YOKE, maybe even more spaces had been flooded. On combat situation the ship 
should have been on condition ZEBRA but if not flooding in these critical spaces could 
have left the ship and its crew to the mercy of the enemy or at least the ship would have 
limited combat capabilities.  
From open sources it is not completely clear if Arleigh Burke -class destroyers have an 
IPMS system or not, and if they have, what kind of system it is. If there is no such system 
or the system is not capable of monitoring flooding or doors and hatches. This kind of 
features could benefit in cases like the collision between USS Fitzgerald and ACX 
Crystal. With flooding and hatch monitoring the crew would immediately see which 
hatches need to be closed if they are open.  
All seven sailors who perished where located in berthing 2. Some of them were sleeping 
during and even after the collision. Complete flooding was estimated to be happening 
only in 30 – 60 seconds and floating debris made it difficult to escape. (Department of 
the Navy, 2017) Flooding this fast would greatly limit any complex crew actions to control 
the flooding. If anything could be done, it should happen almost immediately. For a 
system like IPMS to have any change of saving the crew members automatically it should 
know where the crew is located, how fast the flooding is, where the main source of 
flooding is, current stability situation, status of tanks, weather conditions, ship position, 
map, tactical picture, status of dewatering systems, hatch/door/valve control and 
operational situation (normal or hostile). From this information the system could estimate 
if the speed of water rising in spaces with crew could be delayed by letting water 
intentionally pass through watertight doors and hatches or by adjusting the ship pitch 
and roll. To make this decision the system would need to know where the water will end 
up, will it affect critically the stability, is the ship still recoverable after the crew is 
evacuated, which systems are at risk and if it is suitable for the situation that these 
systems are going to be offline. Platform status coordination (chapter 4.4.2) between 
ships could also aid in these situations. IPMS could calculate if ships’ own systems are 
unable to handle the situation or do their own units nearby have useful capabilities. 
Assistant request with instructions could be sent in advance to the ship coming to 
support. According to the collision report of USS Fitzgerald this would have been difficult 
because external communication was lost (Department of the Navy, 2017). 
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5.2 USS McCain collision with Alnic MC 
USS McCain is an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer which collided with Oil/Chemical 
Tanker Alnic MC on 21st of August 2017. USS McCain was in transit towards Changi 
Naval Base, Singapore. The Helmsman had difficulties in keeping course while adjusting 
propulsion at the same time. Commanding officer noticed this and ordered dividing of 
the rudder and propulsion controls between Helmsman and Lee Helm station. Propulsion 
control was supposed to be transferred but by mistake the rudder control was transferred 
to Lee Helm. Helmsman was unaware of this and observed the loss of steering from its 
station. Making situation more confusing the Helmsman had rudder at 1-4-degree angle 
and when the control was transferred to Lee Helm station it had a setting of 0 degrees. 
This made the ship deviate from its course to port. CO ordered the speed to be lowered 
from 20 knots to 10 knots. Lee Helm reduced the throttle but it had taken control of only 
the port side shaft. Split plant propulsion operation where the gas turbines drive shafts 
independently was selected 3 hour earlier. Starboard shaft speed remained and turn to 
port increased. Backup manual steering was taken in control on the aft steering station, 
only 15 seconds later steering was taken by Helmsman and again after 11 seconds it 
was back at aft steering station. Meanwhile propulsion control was matched, and the 
ship was slowed to 5 knots, but it was still turning to port. 15-degree rudder to starboard 
was ordered and after that USS McCain was on steady course. 14 seconds later bulbous 
bow of tanker Alnic MC hit USS McCain below the water line. (Department of the Navy, 
2017.) 
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Picture 2, Damage on the USS McCain (Department of the Navy, 2017.) 
Material condition on USS McCain was “modified ZEBRA”. These material conditions 
are described in previous chapter of the thesis. Point of impact for the collision was at 
the port side in the location of berthing 5 and 3. Only two of the 12 sailors in berthing 5 
were able to escape. It is estimated that berthing 5 was completely flooded in just 60 
seconds. On berthing 3 most of the 71 sailors assigned there were able to escape. Some 
got trapped but were rescued later. (Department of the Navy, 2017.) 
In many ways USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald casualties are quite similar. Collision 
with object under the waterline allowing fast flooding of berthings, trapping crew inside. 
Some of the IPMS features suggested for USS Fitzgerald could apply for USS McCain 
case also. But in the USS McCain case maybe something could be done to the 
propulsion and rudder control also. Most of the issues leading to the collision maybe 
related to training or crew errors. User interface style which is common across all 
systems would greatly increase the ease of usability and less training or experience is 
needed to master them. Especially if crews are used on multiple different classes of 
ships. Also, a good source of ideas could be airplanes and their fly-by-wire systems. The 
user should tell the system on higher level what the ship should do, and the ship would 
perform necessary actions with its machinery. Of course several different kind of 
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autopilot systems are available but for some reason it seems that they are not always 
trusted. 
5.3 HMS Sheffield sinking 
HMS Sheffield was a Type 42 Destroyer of the Royal Navy. She was part of a task group   
operating in the total exclusion zone near the Falkland Islands during the Falkland war. 
On May 4th, 1982 she was attacked by two Argentine Navy Super Étendard strike-
fighters, armed with Exocet anti-ship-missiles. Two missiles were launched against the 
HMS Sheffield, one missed but one managed to impact. (Loss of HMS Sheffield – Board 
of inquiry, 1982.) 
 
Picture 3, HMS Sheffield after it was hit by an Exocet missile (The Guardian, 2017) 
Hit was received on deck 2 starboard side between the Forward Auxiliary Machinery 
Room, Galley and Forward Engine Room. The missile hit caused 4,5 m by 1,2 m hole 
on the side of the ship. Explosion of the missile also caused widespread minor shock 
damage and large fires broke out. Acrid black smoke rapidly spread across the ship and 
this quickly forced the evacuation of several key rooms. The source of this smoke was 
burning diesel oil and missile propellant. Crew was unable to clear the smoke in the 
forward section and only partially successful in the aft. Damage control efforts after the 
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impact were uncoordinated, no emergency Headquarters (HQ) 1 was established, it was 
not clear which quarters had been abandoned and where the command of the ship was 
located. (Loss of HMS Sheffield – Board of inquiry, 1982.) 
HMS Sheffield had four fire pumps from which only one was able to run for a while. Fire 
mains had been breached at impact and the pressure was never gained. Without the fire 
mains there was no real change to fight the fires with portable pump and buckets. Fires 
spread quickly and not any attempt to fight them was successful. HMS Arrow and HMS 
Yarmouth were able to provide assistance albeit they frequently received submarine and 
torpedo alarms. After four hours of fighting the fire the captain of the HMS Sheffield 
ordered abandon ship. He was convinced the ship’s fighting capability was destroyed 
and it was too risky to keep HMS Arrow and HMS Yarmout vulnerable to enemy attacks. 
HMS Sheffield continued to burn for four days until during tow it sunk due to water ingress 
through the impact hole in bad weather. (Loss of HMS Sheffield – Board of inquiry, 1982.) 
There are multiple reasons why the HMS Sheffield was hit and eventually sunk. The 
base for most of them is human error but also limitations in the combat systems could 
be blamed. What happened after the hit is also a combination of the ship’s and crew’s 
limitations. It might be a bit harsh to say crew limitations because exceptional bravery 
was also seen when the crew was trying to save the ship and keep its ability to fight. 
Crew limitations in this case are more related to human’s inability to work in thick smoke 
and high temperatures.  
So, what could imaginary IPMS do if it would have been installed onboard HMS Sheffield 
in 1982. According to the accident report and newspaper articles the personnel on the 
bridge did nothing when the missile was detected even though the operating procedure 
called turning the ship towards the incoming missile. When the raid was observed on the 
HMS Glasgow it was released to tactical datalink, LINK 10. (The Guardian, 2017, Loss 
of HMS Sheffield – Board of inquiry, 1982.) If HMS Sheffield would have received the 
hostile tracks the information could have been forwarded to IPMS for immediate change 
of heading. This could have been semi-automatic or even fully automatic action taken by 
the system.  
After the hit there was a lot of smoke which blocked access to certain areas. (Department 
of defense, 1987) HMS Sheffield’s HVAC systems are unknown but maybe with 
intelligent automation of ventilation and hatch control the smoke spread could have been 
controlled and the clearance could have been more successful.  
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If firemains could have been isolated by automatic valves in high resolution, some 
pressure may have been able to be formed. Of course if the pumps are not running, not 
much can be done. USS Stark guided missile frigate got hit by two similar kind of Exocet 
anti-ship missiles as HMS Sheffield. Also, on USS Stark firemains were breached but by 
isolating the leak it was possible to gain pressure and eventually the fires were put out.  
Situational awareness and commanding could be increased by IPMS or damage control 
system displays providing information of temperatures, hatch status, location of 
personnel and status of the ship. Now valuable time was lost because of the 
uncoordinated start of damage control activities.  
5.4 HNoMS Helge Ingstad and Sola TS collision 
Only Preliminary report (aibn & daibn, 2018) and part one of the collision report (aibn & 
daibn, 2019) between Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate HNoMS Helge Instad and 
tanker Sola TS is available. Part two with more information about what happened after 
the collision is not available and no date of release has been given by December 2019.  
The accident happened mainly because of human errors, no system malfunction has 
been blamed (aibn & daibn, 2019). From IPMS stand point not much could have been 
done to prevent the accident, at least according to the information available today. Maybe 
if the bridge design had been different or augmented reality systems were used the 
human errors and the followed accident could have been avoided. 
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Picture 4, Sola TS observed from HNoMS Roald Admundsen during test. (aibn & daibn, 
2019) 
 For this thesis the interesting part is that HNoMS Helge Ingstad had an IPMS. There 
were several IPMS consoles from which one console was located on the bridge. When 
the system was updated in 2017 it was possible to update two IPMS consoles while the 
rest were running the old version, this would indicate high level of redundancy in the 
design. According to the Norwegian Armed Forces (Forsvaret, 2019) the IPMS logs could 
be collected from the hard drive on the bridge. Navigation system is integrated to the 
IPMS via Distribution of Navigation signals (DINA) system. From the IPMS recordings 
information, like requested and actual rudder angle at given time, can be read. IPMS was 
updated in 2017 to include features like dynamic kill cards, playback mode, electric 
distribution monitoring, 3D view of equipment and 360⁰ view of compartments. IPMS can 
monitor and control various systems onboard the HNoMS Helge Ingstad. (aibn & daibn, 
2018, 2019, Galaxia Militar, 2017.) 
After the collision with Sola TS flooding occurred in three watertight compartments. All 
propulsion and rudder control were lost and the ship uncontrollably grounded at the 
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nearby shore. According to the accident reports the crew used stability documents but 
not stability computer or IPMS to assess the current stability status. The conclusion was 
that the ship could kept afloat but it is having “poor stability” status. It seems that in the 
aft compartment there was no flooding measurement or there was a malfunction in the 
system because there was uncertainty if it was also flooding or not. The stability status 
of the ship would change to “vessel lost” if more compartments than the previously 
observed two are found to be flooded. (aibn & daibn, 2018; aibn & daibn, 2019.) 
Eventually via the hollow propeller shafts water could pass from aft generator room to 
gear room and from gear room via stuffing boxes to aft and fore engine rooms. 
Evacuation was prepared when this more substantial flooding was found out. Eventually 
the ship sank at the site where it grounded. (aibn & daibn, 2018; aibn & daibn, 2019.)  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusion of this thesis is that there are unlimited number of features what a system 
like IPMS could have. Opinions concerning what features IPMS should have can vary 
depending on who is asked. Some of these variations can be explained by not knowing 
what is possible or if the current practice has been good enough. Some are due to 
restricted experiences from IPMS usage in real operations, some are related to the need 
to keep things as simple as possible. Some persons may have commercial interests 
steering their opinions. It was no a surprise that typically during the interviews there was 
at first some reservation towards the concept of IPMS. What is the point, can it break my 
system and is such a system really needed? All those questions are valid and some of 
them are answered on this work. 
6.1 Summary 
To answer the question if better integration of systems can be the answer to lean 
manning or survivability requirements. The answer is yes on both, it can be one part of 
the solution. Performance of many currently installed systems could be better if they 
would get information from other systems or sensors. It can be quite easily estimated 
what can be done with this additional information but it is more difficult to predict how 
that would affect the performance or survivability of the ship in real life. It is easy to say 
that crew actions have a huge impact on survivability of the ship. And making the crews 
life easier especially in difficult situations the same tasks could be accomplished better 
with less crew. Less people sitting in front of monitors will release personnel to other 
damage control activities. Even if it is difficult to estimate crew performance in different 
situations, one thing sure is that better and more usable situational picture will increase 
crew performance. The good thing with better situational awareness is that it helps in all 
situations, not only when survivability is measured. Depending on what the current level 
is big gains could be seen in this area with carefully designed IPMS solution.  
What size of ships should consider IPMS? The conclusion from this work is that there is 
no limit either way. Even if it is not necessary to control or even monitor multiple and 
complex systems, it can help if the user interface is similar across all vessels in the fleet. 
Especially when personnel is used in multiple different class of ships, accident like the 
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one on USS McCain could be avoided or at least the risk could be lowered with familiar 
user interface. 
What features should IPMS have is of course highly dependent on what kind of ship is 
in question, where it is used and what is its role. With unlimited funding all possible 
features with high level automation could be considered. Sometimes actually simpler 
solution might be better or at least more user friendly. If the ship in question is one of 50, 
where many are in reserve, operational area is calm and enemy is inferior in all areas of 
warfare, less effort could be focused to survivability aspects and more focus on ease of 
use and life cycle costs. In the other end when the ship in question is one of few, 
operational area has tensions and the enemy can match or even have the upper hand 
in some areas of warfare, most of the effort could be put on features increasing 
survivability. Of course, life is not that simple, and the final solution is always a 
compromise. Many of the features or systems addressed in this thesis are linked 
together. For example hatch, door, gate and valve control or status could be required by 
firefighting systems, stability computer, CMS, damage control console, hatch control 
system and HVAC systems. While for example firefighting system should give 
information to stability computer, hatch control and HVAC systems. Integration without 
IPMS could be done but the result could be too complex to be usable and cause 
difficulties for procurement with multiple development contracts and ICD’s to handle. 
 
Figure 7, integration overview without IPMS 
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If IPMS is used the overview of the systems can be a lot simpler and usage of the system, 
simpler.  
 
Figure 8, integration overview with IPMS 
Situational awareness in all operations is crucial. In a complex ship with multiple 
subsystems it can be quite difficult to form quickly. If each subsystem has its own 
operator, they can keep track what is happening with their systems. But if someone must 
command what to do next, having all the information available in user friendly matter can 
make the difference. To ease the workload of the operator some task could be automated 
completely. With automation faster response to unexpected situations could help the 
ship and its crew to survive. Currently all known IPMS solutions are made by humans 
and they all have and will have errors. They can also fail like any other system onboard. 
It must be carefully evaluated how much control can be given to IPMS and how important 
the IPMS is for the ship. This evaluation will give answers to what level of redundancy is 
needed, how it will be protected against environment or threats like cyber-attack and 
should the existence or at least most of the details of such system be kept secret to avoid 
it being targeted.  
Operational performance in the picture on next page means how well all capabilities of 
the ship can and will be used. If some features are hidden in the depth of Keyboard Video 
Mouse (KVM) matrixes and different GUIs which are not used often, they can get 
underutilized or even forgotten when they are needed in real situation. This is where 
even the most lightly featured IPMS could help. Giving the operators a single style of 
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GUI with most used features, it could ease the workload and decrease decision making 
time. 
 
Figure 9, IPMS feature overview 
6.2 Recommendations and directions for further research or development 
Direct continuation for this thesis work could be a detailed design of one or all the 
proposed features. A model could be generated for feature evaluation. It could give 
information on how important each feature is or are some of the features proposed here 
completely useless.  
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